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ABSTRACT 
 
 This paper examines how both the Army as an organization and its small unit leaders 
attempted to maintain the soldiers’ morale in the European Theater of Operations during World 
War II. Morale was critical to the Allied victory in the war, yet the morale of frontline GIs was 
often neglected. This occurred with such frequency that many combat soldiers suffered from a 
new category of wound known as “combat exhaustion.” Through an examination of what 
influenced combat soldiers’ morale, a clearer understanding of what the Army did well and how 
it failed to support combat GIs emerges, as does an explanation for why combat exhaustion 
caused so many casualties during the European campaign. This link between morale 
maintenance and combat exhaustion was critical to the efficiency of combat units during the war 
and ultimately helped determine the shape and outcome of every battle.  
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AUTHOR’S NOTE 
 
 This paper is situated within the context of the US Army during World War II, a period 
and experience with which many readers may be unfamiliar. It was challenging to write about 
the soldiers experiences because their world was very different from modern life. In order to 
understand much of the analysis, a substantial amount of background information is required. As 
much as possible, I have tried to integrate this information into the body of the text or include it 
in the footnotes. Also available for reference is a glossary of acronyms and terms that may be 
unfamiliar to the average reader, but were common in military parlance of the time. Finally, I 
have included a breakdown of the basic units that comprised an US Army infantry division 
during World War II below.  
Structure of US Army Infantry Division 
Squads (usually nine to twelve men) 
Three squads to a platoon 
Three or four platoons to a company 
Three or four companies to a battalion 
Three or four battalions to a regiment 
Three or four regiments to a division 
Plus attached engineers, artillery, medical, and other support personnel. 
 
An infantry division totaled about 15,000 men at full strength, but after entering combat a 
division was rarely at full strength due to the casualties it sustained. These casualties 
sometimes necessitated the reorganization or consolidation of units which accounts for 
the approximations above.
1
 
  
                                                 
1
 Stephen Ambrose, D-Day June 6, 1944: The Climactic Battle of WWII (New York: Simon & Schuster, 
1995), 12. After heavy combat it was not unusual for companies to only have enough men for one or two platoons 
which meant that unit designations were not always accurate descriptions of real unit strength. Sergeant Raymond 
Gantter recorded in his journal on January 31, 1945 that “After two days of pushing, the company now consisted of 
forty-seven men. Three rifle platoons and a weapons platoon—total, forty-seven men. There were twenty-nine men 
in the three rifle platoons. Not all of our losses were from enemy action, however: there were many casualties from 
illness, particularly trenchfoot and frostbite.” Raymond Gantter, Roll Me Over: An Infantryman’s World War II 
(New York: Ivy Books, 1997), 137. 
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Figure 1: Rifle Company Table of Organization 
 
Source: Rush, GI, 27.
 
  
1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
The United States Army overcame many challenges in the Second World War, but one 
challenge it failed to anticipate was the importance morale maintenance would play in a long, 
drawn-out conflict. After the initial fervor and surge of patriotism wore off, “‘high morale’ 
became a substitute for all sorts of lost, valuable things—the critical spirit, for example, or even, 
as John Knowles says, happiness itself, which ‘had disappeared along with rubber, silk and many 
other staples, to be replaced by the wartime synthetic, high morale, for the duration.’”2 Despite 
its importance, the Army struggled at times to maintain high morale levels where it was most 
critical: the frontlines, where the war was actually being fought by squads and platoons of GIs. 
3
 
To the frontline soldier, every day was a struggle to survive the deadly frontline conditions and 
high morale was often vital to his performance and survival. The fulfillment of a basic human 
need could make the difference between surviving another night in sub-freezing conditions in a 
foxhole during the Battle of the Bulge and reaching one’s “breaking point,” thus becoming a 
combat exhaustion casualty.
4
 This paper investigates what caused soldiers’ morale levels as well 
as examine whether or not the Army and its small unit leaders were able to control any of these 
influences.
5
 It also touches upon what was a new classification of casualty for the US Army, 
“combat exhaustion,” and explore how this was the ultimate failure of morale.  
 During World War II, the Army was engaged in operations around the world. This paper 
however, focuses specifically on the Army in European Theater of Operations (ETO). Since 
                                                 
2
Paul Fussell, Wartime: Understanding and Behavior in the Second World War (New York: Oxford 
University Press, 1989), 144.  
3
 See Glossary. 
4
 See Glossary. 
5
 For the purposes of this paper, small unit leaders refers to the captains, lieutenants and sergeants that led 
companies, platoons and squads in frontline ground combat units. See also the Author’s note for an explanation of 
Army organizational structure.  
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environmental factors had such a significant impact on morale, analyzing all theaters, with all of 
their various climates, would be a substantially larger project than could be completed here. 
Focusing on the ETO also allows for a narrowing of the primary time frame investigated to 
1944-1945 because combat operations did not begin until the invasion of Normandy, France on 
June 6, 1944. In order to understand morale maintenance, a definition what morale meant to the 
Army during World War II, why it was important and how it was tracked is established in the 
first section. Following that is an examination of what affected soldiers’ morale and how the 
Army or small unit leaders influenced these causes of soldiers’ morale to either improve morale 
or unintentionally lower soldier’s morale. Lastly, the high incidence of combat exhaustion 
casualties in the ETO and their relationship to soldiers’ morale levels are considered 
 Morale is often a factor in discussions on the American soldier’s experience in World 
War II. In memoirs, veterans often document how they felt during the war and describe what was 
most important to them while engaged in combat. These same elements can also be ascertained 
through careful analysis of period Army reports from the various ETO Army commands. 
Additionally, war correspondent Ernie Pyle attempted to convey the soldier’s experience to his 
readers during the war through his numerous dispatches about frontline life. The Army’s 
Research Branch even conducted a series of studies called the Soldier Surveys which specifically 
asked soldiers for their opinions on a wide variety of issues during the war.
6
 Samuel Stouffer and 
                                                 
6
 The Research Branch, tasked with studying the attitudes of America’s citizen soldiers, was the first 
organization of its kind. The Research Branch was formed in October, 1941 as part of the Army’s Information and 
Education Division and was comprised of psychology, sociology and statistical analysis experts who used the most 
modern social science methods available. Its job was to conduct systematic and scientific research projects and 
investigations on the thoughts, opinions and beliefs of US soldiers. It was noted that when being surveyed, soldiers 
took their task seriously as demonstrated by the “painstaking detail” with which they wrote out free-response 
answers. The purpose of this was to provide commanders with useful and accurate information from which they 
could make decisions. The Research Branch produced more than 300 of these surveys during the war and questioned 
more than half a million soldiers. These sources are some of the most useful, comprehensive and respected ones in 
the field. Samuel Stouffer et al, Studies in Social Psychology in World War II (Princeton: Princeton University Press 
1949), 1:Ch. 1. 
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other social psychologists who conducted the surveys during the war returned to these surveys 
after the war and thoroughly reanalyzed them in the multi-volume work Studies in Social 
Psychology in World War II. Several historians including Charles B. MacDonald, Paul Fussell, 
S.L.A. Marshall, Michael Doubler and John McManus have also touched on morale from various 
angles in their work. All of the above sources acknowledge that soldiers’ morale was an 
important factor during World War II but, no one has yet investigated what caused soldiers’ 
morale levels and the connection to combat exhaustion. All of the scattered descriptions and 
analysis of morale is brought together here, in order to examine all of the causes for combat 
soldiers’ morale levels and how the Army and small unit leaders attempted to influence these 
factors.  
  
  
4 
SECTION 1: UNDERSTANDING MORALE 
 
What is Morale 
In order to maintain morale or even asses it, one must first define it. The concept of 
morale is often understood inherently in conversation, but its intangibility makes it difficult to 
define concretely or express in words. Nevertheless, this essay requires an examination of the 
definition of morale in order to assess how it affected GIs in and how its maintenance was 
approached by the Army during World War II. To better appreciate what is meant by morale, 
several definitions from historians, a journalist and official Army publications are examined. 
While all of these struggle to precisely define morale in its entirety as individuals, using them 
collectively, allows for a thorough understanding of the expansive scope and significance the 
term morale encompassed.  
In 1944, the US Army Service Forces (ASF) published manual M207: Building Morale in 
the ASF which was designed to help leaders address the issue of morale in their units.
7
 Archival 
research has not yielded an equivalent manual on morale published by the Army Ground Forces 
(AGF) that would apply specifically to ground combat units. Such a manual would be ideal, but 
history has left only the ASF manual. M207 can still be quite useful though because Army 
doctrine is passed down the chain of command starting at the top with the Department of the 
Army to subordinate commands like the ASF and AGF. Therefore, official positions on morale 
would have been in agreement between the ASF and AGF because they were both subordinate 
commands. Thus, the assumption is that the official commentary on morale in M207 is also valid 
                                                 
7
 Army Service Forces refers to the branches of the US Army (e.g. Quartermaster, Transportation, and 
Ordnance) that provided logistic and infrastructure support for Army operations. These branches were not generally 
engaged in combat under normal wartime circumstances. Army Service Forces Manual M207: Building Morale in 
the ASF, 8 August 1944, box 1011, Record Group 330, Research Division Surveys on Troop Attitudes 1942 - Jun 
1955: Miscellaneous Reports-Unnumbered, National Archives II, College Park, MD.  
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and applicable to the AGF. This assumption is reinforced with the quoting of General George C. 
Marshall, the Army’s Chief of Staff in the section of M207 titled “What is Morale?” As the Chief 
of Staff, General Marshall was the highest ranking officer in the Army during World War II and 
therefore, his position on a subject like morale would have influenced on the position adopted by 
the entire Army, including the ASF and the AGF. 
In manual M207, the ASF attempts to zero-in on a definition of morale by offering 
several different definitions from prominent Army commanders. The Adjutant General of the 
Army, Major General Ulio, highlighted the qualities of pride and confidence in his definition of 
morale. Civil War General Sheridan equated morale with the soldiers’ level of absolute 
confidence. Both of these definitions, however, are rather over simplified, for if morale is really 
just pride and confidence, then why does the term morale even exist? The very fact that morale is 
important enough for the Army write a whole manual on it indicates that it was a fairly complex 
subject composed of more elements than just pride and confidence. Below are General 
Marshall’s thoughts on morale’s definition: 
First in importance will be the development of high morale and the 
building of sound discipline, based on wise leadership and a spirit of mutual 
cooperation throughout all ranks. Morale, engendered by thoughtful consideration 
of officers and enlisted men by their commanders, will produce a cheerful and 
understanding subordination of the individual to the good of the team. This is the 
essence of the American Standard of discipline, and it is a primary responsibility 
of leaders to develop and maintain such a standard.
8
 
 
While the manual presents this as General Marshall’s definition of morale, he only talks about it 
in a tangential way. This is most unhelpful because he does not aid in deconstructing the 
complexities of the term. Then, instead of synthesizing these three definitions into one clear and 
                                                 
8
 Ibid., 2A-1-2. 
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concise definition, the manual moves on to the next section which lists the four components of 
morale as zeal, discipline, self-confidence, and satisfaction.
9
 
The chapter in M207 closes with the acknowledgment that “there are many definitions of 
morale, covering everything from the belief in why one fights to satisfaction with one’s mess.10 
No single definition can cover all the elements that constitute morale.”11 This admission reveals 
the Army’s overarching philosophy towards morale maintenance during World War II. In place 
of monitoring and regulating morale from the highest command echelons, the Army recognized 
the importance of morale in battlefield success and trained its junior leaders to understand this 
and manage it at the lowest level possible. Thus, the responsibility to maintain morale in ground 
combat units fell to the NCOs and company grade officers. Only in cases where the extremely 
poor condition of morale necessitates action did higher commands get involved in directing 
trying to manage individual soldiers’ morale. For example, in the Normandy campaign higher 
headquarters had to react to the growing number of combat exhaustion cases which were 
draining the manpower of combat units.   
 The next two sources who addressed the definition of morale are war correspondent Ernie 
Pyle and historian Paul Fussell. Both were extremely close to the Army in World War II and 
understood it intimately. This allows them a special privilege to write about how morale was 
understood in the Army during the war. They do not have the official authority of M207, but 
provide valuable commentary on morale’s definition.  
 Pyle was a highly respected journalist during the war whose dispatches were widely 
published and read. He was also beloved by GIs for his truthful and accurate descriptions of 
frontline life in his dispatches. Pyle spent most of his time attached to frontline troops and while 
                                                 
9
 Ibid., 2A-2. 
10
 See Glossary.  
11
 Ibid., 2D-1.  
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he was technically a noncombatant, he had extensive experience with ground combat units.
12
 As 
a result, he could honestly claim, “I’ve been around war long enough to know that nine-tenths of 
morale is pride in your outfit and confidence in your leaders and fellow fighters.”13 In this case, 
the statements on morale from M207 are corroborated, but Pyle does not dance around his 
definition. Pyle also explicitly states what morale is not: 
A lot of people have morale confused with the desire to fight. I don’t 
know of one soldier out of ten thousand who wants to fight. They certainly didn’t 
in that company. The old-timers were sick to death of battle, and the new 
replacements were scared to death of it. And yet the company went on into battle, 
and it was a proud company.
14
 
 
This is an important distinction Pyle makes because it describes the mental state of GIs in 
combat, which in turn affected their morale and influenced what the Army could do to attempt to 
maintain high soldier morale.  
 The second source presented here is the view of historian Paul Fussell. Fussell is an 
important World War II historian because he was actually an Army Infantry officer during the 
European campaign in World War II. This means he had first-hand experience with morale in 
ground combat units. Fussell presents the transformation of morale’s definition during the war 
from simple to complex as evidence of the concept of morale’s growth and development during 
the war. He argues that the prewar definition was much simpler and straightforward, whereas the 
postwar definition is much more complete as a result of morale’s significant influence during the 
                                                 
12
 A note on Pyle: Pyle was a Pulitzer Prize winner and reported on many theaters of the war, starting with 
the North African campaign in 1942 and continuing through the Sicilian and Italian campaigns. He then covered the 
D-Day landings and remained in the ETO until September 1944. Pyle’s dispatches were purposely written in a 
generic form which caused many soldiers fighting around the world to be able to relate to the experiences he 
detailed. Because he wrote about universal experiences and emotions that could transcend specific dates and 
locations during the war, his work has been cited often in this essay. However, care has been taken in selection of 
the quoted passages to ensure that they are relevant and appropriate to the topic in question. Symbolic of his 
dedication to telling the story of the frontline soldier, Pyle was killed in 1945 while reporting on the frontlines 
during the battle for Okinawa.  
  
13
 Ernie Pyle, Brave Men (New York: H. Holt and Company, 1944), 194.  
14
 Ibid. 
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war. Further he claims that, “…raising and sustaining morale became all-important, and morale 
itself developed into one of the unique obsessions of the Allies in the Second World War.”  The 
resultant definition, molded by the war and accepted by Fussel is: 
 Morale: Prevailing mood and spirit, conducive to willing and dependable 
performance, steady self-control, and courageous, determined conduct despite danger and 
privations, based upon a conviction of being in the right and on the way to success and 
upon faith in the cause or program and in the leadership, usually connoting, esp. when 
qualified by the adjective high, a confident aggressive, resolute, often buoyant, spirit of 
wholehearted co-operation in a common effort, often attended particularly by zeal, self-
sacrifice, or indomitableness.
15
 
 
This definition best illustrates the complexity of the morale issue during World War II. It 
encompassed many different aspects of a soldier’s spirit and was applicable in a wide variety of 
situations. Fussell’s definition provides a more encompassing perspective on morale from which 
this paper can investigate the full scope of morale’s causes and influences. This is not to say that 
pride and confidence are not important to morale. That they are important is proposed by the 
Army and confirmed by Pyle. It is through the synthesis of all of these definitions that the 
investigation and analysis of morale maintenance in the Army during World War II will be most 
effective and complete.  
 The problem of morale’s definition arises from the fact that unlike this paper, the Army 
failed to pursue a definition that encompassed more than pride and confidence. This limited 
definition of morale then made it difficult to identify the wide variety of causes of soldiers’ 
morale levels. The lack of a thorough definition prevented the Army from effectively 
maintaining soldiers’ morale levels throughout the war; a fault which ultimately produced 
casualties and reduced the Army’s combat effectiveness.  
                                                 
15
 Fussell, Wartime, 144.  
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The Importance of Morale  
 Despite its lack of a thorough definition, the importance of morale was not undersold by 
the Army during the war. M207 admonishes its audience, Army officers, from the beginning that 
“Morale may seem like a little thing, too, yet it determines the shape of battles and the fate of 
nations.”16 Morale was a vital component to every military operation. High morale was regarded 
as almost essential to success and low morale as a possible grounds for failure, which in a 
military context, could be catastrophic. Low morale was always a cause for concern by 
commanders. The good news for commanders was that, “Good morale mean[t] better 
performance: How well a man perform[ed] his job [was] affected by the state of his morale.”17 
M207 provides a good example of how in an Engineer regiment, building the Alaska Highway in 
unforgiving conditions, had their morale buoyed through a simple organized hunt to obtain meat 
for their mess. This act encouraged the men in the completion of a vital defensive logistical route 
between the continental US and Alaska.  
 Not surprisingly, there are more recorded cases of low morale and its negative effects 
than of high morale’s positive ones. This is partially because officers were expected to build 
morale and maintain a positive atmosphere in their units. High morale was just another 
component necessary for mission success and only the absence of high morale or a failed 
mission were likely to attract special attention. Pyle recorded just such an incident that would 
have been a warning sign of low morale to this unit’s leadership:  
 The soldiers [Infantrymen from the 9
th
 Division] around us had a two 
weeks’ growth of beard. Their uniforms were worn slick and very dirty—the 
uncomfortable gas impregnated clothes they had come ashore in. The boys were 
tired. They had been fighting and moving constantly forward on foot for nearly 
three weeks without rest—sleeping out on the ground, wet most of the time, 
                                                 
16
 Building Morale in the ASF, 1A-3.  
17
 Ibid., 2D-1. 
10 
 
 
 
always tense, eating cold rations, seeing their friends die. One of them came up to 
me and said, almost belligerently, ‘Why don’t you tell the folks back home what 
this is like? All they hear about is victories and a lot of glory stuff. They don’t 
know that for every hundred yards we advance somebody gets killed. Why don’t 
you tell them how tough this life is?’ I told him that was what I tried to do all the 
time. This fellow was pretty fed up with it all. He said he didn’t see why his outfit 
wasn’t sent home; they had done all the fighting. That wasn’t true at all, for there 
were other divisions that had fought more and taken heavier casualties. 
Exhaustion will make a man feel like that. A few days’ rest usually has him 
smiling again.”18 
 
In this dispatch, Pyle has encountered a veteran combat soldier who has had enough of combat. 
This negative attitude was common among veteran combat soldiers. The soldier described was 
not brimming with pride or confidence and was vocalizing the low status of his morale. For a 
leader, this could pose a dangerous problem should this soldier chose to disobey orders and 
jeopardize the mission or other soldiers’ lives, although it was unlikely he would willfully 
endanger his comrades. The more likely outcome, if the soldier did not receive the needed rest 
Pyle mentions, was that this soldier would break under the continued stress of frontline combat. 
This soldier would then become a combat exhaustion casualty and require evacuation from the 
frontline.  
 Pyle also provides a contrasting situation. While in similarly terrible frontline conditions, 
he remarked, “the thing that always amazed me about those inhumane night movements of 
troops in war areas was how good-natured the men were about it. A certain fundamental 
appreciation of the ridiculousness carried them through. As we slogged along, slipping and 
crawling and getting muddier and muddier, the soldier behind me said, ‘I’m going to write my 
congressman about this.’”19 This passage illustrates the critical point that just because the 
situation was dangerous and the soldiers were miserable, there was not an automatic 
                                                 
18
 Pyle, Brave Men, 424-25. 
19
 Pyle, Brave Men, 213. 
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deterioration of morale levels. High morale could be maintained in even the worst conditions. 
Additionally, the American GI was quite resilient and took a lot of punishment. While there were 
certainly a wide range of factors that had an effect on morale, which the next chapter will 
investigate, opportunities existed for high morale even in the brutal combat faced by the Army’s 
Ground Forces in Europe.    
Tracking Morale  
The simplest explanation for why morale was not tracked army-wide is because it was 
too complicated and impractical to develop and implement a system which could have accurately 
evaluated such an expansive and dynamic concept as morale in ground combat units on the 
frontlines. It presumably would have required a huge amount of manpower to investigate morale 
levels for all of the units in an army millions strong. Additionally, it would have been impractical 
to assess the morale of soldiers and units stationed in remote areas around the world and as well 
as those engaged in combat. Moreover, by the time an investigation had been finished and a 
report was submitted, the tactical situation on the ground would most likely have changed, thus 
affecting morale levels and rendering the report obsolete. The Army had many pressing concerns 
during the war, all of which demanded manpower and resources and the Army appears to have 
chosen not to devote resources to comprehensive, Army wide morale tracking program.  
The alternative solution adopted by the Army was to place responsibility for morale 
maintenance as far down the chain of command as possible (as was implied by M207). This 
meant that morale maintenance became the responsibility of small unit leaders at the squad, 
platoon and company levels. This approach eliminated the geographical, logistical and 
manpower problems that would have been posed by an army-wide morale tracking program. 
With this system, only major morale problems made their way up the chain of command. For 
12 
 
 
 
example, the 101
st
 Airborne Division training in England prior to D-Day experienced a severe 
case of low morale due to a lack of confidence in the company commander among the members 
of E Company, 506
th
 Parachute Infantry Regiment. Confidence was so low that the NCOs of the 
company took drastic action to get the commander replaced before the invasion took place. All 
but a couple of the NCOs wrote a letter to the regimental commander stating that they no longer 
wished to serve as an NCO in E Company and were turning I their “stripes.”20 This action 
amounted to munity for which they all “could be shot.” Luckily, none were, the company 
commander was replaced, and morale improved immediately, but this was the type of extreme 
situation which necessitated the involvement of more senior commanders, in this case the 
regimental commander.
21
 
Junior officers were responsible for maintaining the morale of the soldiers under their 
command. In order to maintain morale though, officers first needed a mechanism by which to 
evaluate morale levels in their unit M207 provides this guidance:  
An officer can keep himself informed of the morale in his outfit by 
observing their attitudes and their performance. Morale attitudes are evidenced by 
the expression of certain opinions on the part of troops. While the officer may not 
conduct formal morale surveys among his men, he can watch for expressions of 
attitudes which indicate low morale. Performance indicative of low morale is 
readily perceived by the sensitive officer. Some of the many indicators are:
22
 
 
                                                 
20
 NCO ranks were denoted on their uniforms by a series of chevrons on their upper sleeves and were often 
referred to as “stripes.”  
21
 Stephen Ambrose, Band of Brothers: E Company, 506th Regiment, 101st Airborne from Normandy to 
Hitler’s Eagle’s Nest (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001), 52.   
22
 Building Morale in the ASF, 2D-1-2.  
* This information is presented in list form in the original source, but has been reformatted here for the 
reader’s convenience.  
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Figure 2: ASF Indicators of Low Morale* 
Excessive AWOL or desertion 
cases. 
Excessive amount of company 
punishment. 
Inattention during training 
sessions. 
High venereal disease rate. Large number of courts martial. Large number of troop quarrels.  
Large number of transfer 
requests. 
Carelessness in dress, saluting, 
etc. 
Carelessness with military 
equipment. 
Large number of malingerers. Slow response to commands. High sick rate. 
Source: Building Morale in the ASF, 2D-1-2 
 
This guidance from M207 was geared more towards garrison environments or areas away 
from combat zones, but it is useful in that it illustrates how officers were supposed to approach 
morale maintenance. Officers were trained to be cognizant of morale levels and to deal with a 
wide variety of situations they might encounter with their units through critical thinking and 
problem solving. They were not given formulaic instructions on how to react to very specific 
situations because it was impossible to train for every possible scenario an officer might 
encounter. This training program kept with the Army’s methodology of dealing with morale at 
the small unit level unless a special circumstance required a more senior level of involvement.   
 The Army’s failure to understand fully how expansive of a concept morale was inhibited 
its ability to maintain combat soldiers’ morale during World War II. The choice to place the 
responsibility for morale maintenance on small unit leaders, affected soldiers’ morale levels 
because it determined what causes could and could not be manipulated in the soldiers’ favor by 
either the Army or the small unit leaders. This had major implications for soldiers’ and units’ 
combat effectiveness because morale was so critical importance to battlefield success. 
Unfortunately, morale would prove to pose significant problems for the Army in the ETO from 
1944 to 1945.  
  
14 
SECTION 2: CAUSES OF SOLDIERS’ MORALE LEVELS 
 
With morale being such a complex concept, it is no surprise that there were a multitude 
of influences on soldiers’ morale levels in the ETO. These influences have been broken down 
into four distinct categories within this chapter which are: Pride, Credit and Camaraderie, 
Necessities of Combat, Tactical Concerns and Escape from the Frontlines. Each of these 
categories deals with related sub-issues all of which affected GIs’ morale. This chapter examines 
how each of these elements influenced morale and how both the Army as an organization and 
small unit leaders were able to manipulate these elements while attempting to improve soldiers’ 
overall morale while simultaneously maintaining combat effectiveness of units and individuals.  
This figure below is a visual guide to understanding the interplay between the influences 
on soldiers’ morale. This map demonstrates how a multitude of influences converged to 
collectively affect soldiers’ morale. While many of these elements are closely connected, they 
have been divided here into the four distinct categories mentioned above. The purpose for these 
divisions is to make the complex concept of morale easier to analyze methodically. The visual 
representation also demonstrates how many different facets morale encompassed during World 
War II.  
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Figure 3: Influences on Soldiers’ Morale 
 
 
Pride, Credit and Camaraderie  
The level of pride soldiers’ had in their outfit; whether or not a unit was receiving credit 
for its actions, contributions, and achievements in combat; and the atmosphere of camaraderie 
present within a unit were all important and constant influences on GIs’ morale levels while they 
were in combat.
23
 These factors are special in that they tended to affect the morale of a unit as a 
whole instead of individual soldiers. Therefore they had a great influence on a unit’s overall 
combat effectiveness as opposed to influences that affected soldiers on an individual level. Of 
note here is the use of the more generic term unit in place of specifying a particular size of unit 
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such as a company or a division because these factors can function at multiple organizational 
levels simultaneously. 
Pride played a prominent role in soldiers’ morale. In the following case recorded by Pyle, 
the company’s pride in itself promoted high morale was critical to their combat effectiveness and 
their repeated high performance in combat. Pyle observed, “I’ve never seen a man prouder of his 
company than Lieutenant Sheehy, and the men in it were proud too.” Pyle carefully clarified that 
the soldiers had no desire to fight because “the old-timers were sick to death of battle, and the 
new replacements were scared to death of it.” An important component of the unit’s high morale, 
he noted, was that even though they were scared and did not want to be in combat, “the company 
went on into battle, and it was a proud company.”24 The “pervasive belief” was that “the best 
way to end the war was to end it as quickly as possible with a minimum of casualties while 
inflicting maximum damage on the enemy.”25 Pyle’s dispatch demonstrates that this company, 
having been put in a position to help end the war, were going to do their best to do so in order to 
maintain their own personal pride and the prestige of their company. No other company was 
going to be able to say that their company had failed to do their part to end the war. Thus, their 
pride became the foundation for their high morale which was critical to maintaining their combat 
effectiveness as a unit. Had this company not had pride in itself and its important contribution to 
the war effort, fear might have gained control over the GIs and destroyed unit cohesion which 
would have significantly reduced combat effectiveness. 
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When Captain Charles B. MacDonald led his infantry company into the frontlines for the 
first time at the beginning of October 1944, he too detected the effect pride had on both himself 
and his company. He recalled, “I was thoroughly imbued with the spirit common among all 
infantrymen that ‘my outfit is the best damned outfit in the whole damned Army.’ It could boast 
of a record to prove it.”26He continued to note that “I had admired the unglamorous infantry 
before, but as the rain continued to fall and the night grew colder my pride at being part of this 
dirty, miserable infantry knew no bounds.”27 MacDonald’s baptism by fire occurred during tough 
fighting on the German defensive position called the Siegfried Line and in the following months, 
his memoir demonstrates how, when lacking in materiel support and operating beyond expected 
levels of human endurance, his company was still able to perform effectively in combat.
28
 
Undoubtedly, a portion of this success can be attributed to the intangible pride in their outfit that 
MacDonald’s company of soldiers was able to draw on for strength in the direst of situations. 
Pride is interesting because it was often an indication that a unit that had high morale. Also 
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though, the collective pride of the outfit is what supported individual soldiers’ morale and this 
helped MacDonald’s company achieve success on the Siegfried Line. Finally, that battlefield 
success further increased the unit’s pride in its achievements and made it more effective in future 
combat operations. Pride, being an intangible influence on morale, was difficult to influence and 
while the Army encouraged soldiers to take pride in their outfits, it often took exposure to tough, 
brutal combat for soldiers to really take pride in their units and be proud of its accomplishments. 
Whether a combat unit received credit for its actions could also have a serious effect on 
that unit’s morale. Receiving credit depended in part on public perception, an area where the 
Army failed miserably for ground combat units in general and the infantry specifically, even 
though these units did most of the fighting in Europe. The Army’s Research Branch concluded 
that the Army “did not succeed in giving to the Infantry the kind of status which the Marine 
Corps has achieved through its publicity campaign.”29 This lack of recognition was particularly 
insulting to infantrymen fighting in Europe because the Marine Corps was primarily made up of 
infantry soldiers doing the same job as infantrymen in the Army, just in a different location, 
under a different organization, yet the Marines received significantly more press coverage for 
their accomplishments in combat. The infantry and other ground combat units also struggled to 
compete with the inherent romance and glory attributed to the Army Air Corps, whose newness 
and advanced technology made it extremely popular with civilians on the home front.
30
  
Eventually the Army realized that this was not only unfair to the frontline Army infantry, 
but it was also hurting their morale since they were not being credited with helping win the war 
like the Air Corps and Marines were. In order to counteract this, the Army “initiated a systematic 
program to raise the prestige of the Infantry.” As part of this program, Congress increased 
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infantry pay (an action Pyle strongly advocated), a “large-scale publicity campaign” was 
launched, and two special awards were created exclusively for the infantry. They were the Expert 
Infantryman’s Badge (EIB) and the Combat Infantryman’s Badge (CIB).31 Of these new awards, 
the CIB was very well received since it could only be awarded to infantrymen who had served on 
the frontlines and consequently it became the mark of a true combat veteran. This was one way 
the Army did well in helping to improve the morale of infantrymen throughout the Army by 
grant credit upon them through an official award.  
The Army was wise to heed Pyle’s recommendations as part of their program. This was 
not only because he was widely respected as a spokesman for frontline GIs, but also because as 
Fussell explains, “It was the main concern of Ernie Pyle to confer credit upon the humble and the 
normally overlooked,” which were the infantry and other ground combat units. “Gen. Omar 
Bradley once said, ‘My men always fought better when Ernie was around.’ And the truth was 
that most servicemen would rather have this names appear in one of Pyle’s dispatches than a 
medal unless the award of the medal was very widely publicized.”32 Accordingly, these 
appraisals by Bradley and Fussell keep with the assessment that soldiers’ morale improved 
through credit gained by publicity and the issuance of the CIB which universally represented the 
combat service of the wearer.   
Pyle demonstrated his effectiveness at giving credit where credit was really due as he 
demonstrated with this dispatch that publicized the actions and contributions of the 9
th
 Infantry 
Division while it was fighting in the Mediterranean: 
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For some reason which we have never fathomed the Ninth wasn’t released 
through censorship as early as it should have been, while other divisions were. As 
a result, the division got a complex that it was being slighted. They fought hard, 
took heavy casualties, and did a fine job generally, but nobody back home knew 
anything about it. Lack of recognition definitely affects morale. Every 
commanding general is aware that publicity for his unit is a factor in morale. Not 
publicity in the manufactured sense, but a public report to the folks back home on 
what an outfit endures and what it accomplishes. The average dogfoot will go 
through his share of hell a lot more willingly if he knows that he is getting some 
credit for it and that the folks back home know about it.
33
  
 
Pyle summed up the sentiment about receiving credit perfectly in this dispatch and more 
importantly conveyed this feeling to the home front so they were aware that their recognition of 
the contribution and sacrifices made by frontline GIs was important to their morale. Combat 
soldiers were not fighting for glory, but for survival. As they did so, however, they were helping 
to win the war and a little acknowledgement of their suffering went a long way towards 
sustaining them in combat. Thus, when the Army or commanders were able to produce some 
publicity for frontline units or recognize them for their actions in combat, morale improved. 
While recognition did not make closing with and destroying the enemy any less difficult or 
dangerous, the resultant higher morale certainly helped soldiers through it. 
 In addition to pride and credit, camaraderie among combat soldiers played an important 
part in supporting unit and individual morale. World War II combat was a distinct experience 
from previous wars in that very small groups of men spent long periods of time together, isolated 
from the outside world. They were also engaged in exceedingly dangerous modern combat which 
required these small groups to fight outside the direct observation and control of their leadership. 
Consequently, the men in these small groups had to rely on each other to survive combat. It was 
this shared experience that led Pyle to write, “the ties that grow between men who live savagely 
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together, relentlessly communicating with Death, are ties of great strength.”34 That strength was 
something that did not need to be supplied by the Army, nor could it breakdown mechanically, 
so when in the most dire situations, combat soldiers placed great value on being able to trust their 
comrades and draw strength from them.  
Camaraderie also provided a familial sense of comfort that was lacking from soldiers’ 
lives due to long deployments away from families and in foreign countries. These strong bonds 
often led men to make decisions for the benefit of their comrades, even at their own personal 
expense. Take the actions of Sergeant Frank “Buck” Eversole for example. One evening when 
his company was about to make an attack, Buck received the rare chance to go to a rest area for 
five days. His first reaction, however, was to turn down the opportunity in order to lead his squad 
during the attack. While his lieutenant told him to go to the rest camp, Buck was so duty-bound 
to his comrades that he admitted he felt “like a deserter” even after he was ordered to the rest 
camp. Pyle described this seemingly illogical phenomenon as a “powerful fraternalism in this 
ghastly brotherhood of war.”35  
This camaraderie among soldiers in ground combat units could have negative effects on 
soldiers’ morale too though. When casualties were high in frontline units, as they often were, the 
camaraderie among soldiers tended to suffer. This was because the “old originals,” the men who 
had been with the unit when it first entered combat would grow closer together as there were 
fewer and fewer of them left unwounded in a unit, “sometimes no more than a dozen in an 
infantry company” which would have started with almost 200 men.36 Meanwhile, new 
replacement soldiers would be brought in to take the place of soldiers who had been wounded. 
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“Unquestionably on the bottom rung of the social ladder were the latest replacements, who 
arrived friendless and forlorn and stayed that way until the other men decided to accept them.”37 
It was often difficult for these “new” and “old” men to develop a close camaraderie because the 
“old” soldiers were hesitant to make new friends. Gene Garrison of the 87th Infantry Division 
explained the reasoning behind this after his machine-gun squad received replacements. “I 
recognized that a machine-gun crew working in such proximity would lead to friendships. I had 
lost enough friends.”38 This fear of losing even more close friends what inhibited the quick 
establishment of camaraderie between veterans and replacements.  
On top of this fear of pain from loss, the “new” and “old” had little in common since the 
“old originals” had been together for so long and had experienced the trials of combat together. 
Not until the “new” replacements spent time in combat would they form strong bonds with the 
“old” men and be assimilated into that group. Many new replacements, however, had little 
opportunity to assimilate because they often quickly became casualties due to their inexperience. 
In one typical example, a squad leader in the 318
th
 Infantry Regiment noted in a War Department 
Observers Board report that “new men have a very bad habit of bunching together in their first 
battles. This draws direct artillery and mortar fire.”39 This sort of action was a result of 
inexperience and abbreviated training, and it led to very high casualty rates among replacements. 
“Often more than half became casualties within the first three days on the line.” (See Appendix 
A for Casualty Charts).
40
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The Army’s replacement system was extremely detrimental to the building of 
camaraderie in frontline units. The policy was to fill vacancies left by casualties on an individual 
basis rather than as full units or even as small groups of men who knew each other from training 
and had already developed some camaraderie. While this was an easier system statistically and 
logistically, it was terrible for both the replacement and for the unit receiving replacements.
 41
 
Receiving individual replacement soldiers presented a challenge because they had to be 
integrated into the unit while it was engaged in combat which was nearly impossible to do 
effectively. As a replacement, Sergeant Gantter had to wait to join his new unit since they were 
in the middle of an attack when he and many other individual replacements arrived. He 
remembers that “we were so green and there were so many of us [replacements] that we’d be 
more hindrance than help to the seasoned veterans on the line.”42 The replacement system failed 
to provide any time for camaraderie or unit cohesion to develop either among the replacements 
or between the replacements and the “old” men. Officers like 1st Lieutenant Harry Bechel of the 
318
th
 Infantry Regiment recognized that making “the replacements feel they are part of the 
platoon as much as the old men” was critical to the unit’s morale and success, but officers could 
only focus on this goal when the battlefield situation allowed and this seldom happened.
43
  
Replacements were thrown into a situation that was terrifying and that they knew very 
little about. One replacement described the experience as “just like being an orphan. You are 
away from anybody you know and feel lost and lonesome.”44 This was true both in the 
replacement depots where new replacements waited to be assigned to a unit and in the middle of 
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the battlefield once they were with their outfit.
45
 Replacements were often wounded or killed 
within just days or even hours of arriving at the front because there was no way to immediately 
train them on how to survive on the line. They were assigned positions on the line right away 
because of the desperate need for manpower.  
The replacement system probably contributed to higher casualty rates because of the 
vulnerable position the replacements were in, nevertheless this was the policy maintained by the 
Army throughout the war. Small unit leaders recognized the faults of this system and tried their 
best to integrate replacements into their unit as quickly as possible in order to preserve unit 
cohesion, improve morale and sustain combat effectiveness, but this was not always feasible 
under combat conditions. Despite leaders’ efforts, everyone suffered under this system from the 
replacements to the veteran soldiers who had to shoulder the bulk of the fighting to the leaders 
like this sergeant described by Pyle who became demoralized after trying to take care of the new 
replacements he was assigned. The sergeant fell into despair because they were killed so often 
that he finally said to his captain, “I’ve got so I feel like it’s me killin’ ‘em instead of a German. 
I’ve got so I feel like a murderer. I hate to look at them when the new ones come in.”46 This 
feeling of responsibility for young men’s deaths quickly took a toll on leaders’ morale levels and 
affected their combat effectiveness. Even though it severely affected soldier and unit morale very 
negatively, the Army maintained the same replacement policy for the rest of the war.   
The influences of pride, receiving credit and camaraderie had significant impacts on 
combat GIs’ morale levels during the campaigns in the ETO. Unfortunately it was likely that 
morale would be degraded through insufficient pride in one’s unit, a lack of credit being awarded 
to combat soldiers for their substantial sacrifices and contributions towards winning the war or 
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an absence of camaraderie due to the high casualty rates and perpetuated by the replacement 
system. The Army attempted to increase pride and confer credit on an individual level through 
the CIB and on the unit level via a publicity campaign. GIs still found these measures lacking, 
but, the CIB and publicity campaign eventually increased slightly the pride infantry soldiers had 
in their branch. Combat soldiers’ pride in their unit also increased as they achieved difficult 
objectives and won victories across Europe.
47
 Finally, despite the high casualty rates and a faulty 
replacement system, GIs continued to form strong bonds over their shared experiences on the 
battlefield.  
The Necessities of Combat 
The phrase, “the life of a combat soldier” creates too inaccurate a picture of the situation 
a combat soldier actually found themselves in. It was much more of an existence than a life. 
Sergeant Gantter thought that if he cracked (became a combat exhaustion casualty) it would “be 
from sheer physical discomfort, from too much mud and snow and water.”48 Every day was a 
fight for survival, and too often it was not only the enemy that soldiers had to fight. In contrast to 
more emotional influences on morale like pride, receiving credit and camaraderie were a 
soldier’s physical needs on the battlefield and often it was a struggle to fulfill the most basic of 
life’s necessities. This task was hard enough under combat conditions, but the difficulty was 
often increased by the challenges imposed by the weather of Northwest Europe. From the very 
beginning, stormy weather threatened the success of the Normandy invasion, thereby 
complicating the logistical situation through the destruction of key ports in addition to the 
German tactic of sabotaging port facilities before the Allies could capture them. This problem 
precipitated a trickle-down effect to the frontline soldiers and the supply problems resulting from 
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inadequate port facilities would plague the ETO for months to come. In another example of the 
weather hindering operations, prolonged rain and military traffic produced operation stalling 
mud in the Hurtgen Forest during the fall of 1944. Then again during the Battle of the Bulge, a 
combination of snowstorms and extreme low temperatures jeopardized the entire Allied 
defensive front, which in turn meant miserable fighting conditions for the soldiers and an even 
more dangerous and precarious tactical situation than normal. So it must be kept in mind that 
logistical problems in the ETO were constantly complicated not only by enemy actions, but by 
difficult weather conditions as well.  
While the weather served to compound problems, create headaches and generally lower 
morale, there was little anyone could do to fix the weather. In the meantime, there were a host of 
problems, accentuated by the weather that could have been corrected if the Army had taken a 
different approach. The acquisition of the necessities of life like food, shelter and clothing were 
all problematic for the combat soldier, but as Sergeant Gantter recalls “soldiers…are concerned 
with five things only. Three of them are physical: food, sleep and shelter.”49 Since GIs’ existence 
was generally focused on these smaller things, they’re availability or lack thereof had a 
substantial impact on his morale level.  
 Food was a daily fixation and “a major topic of conversation” for combat soldiers.50 As 
Napoleon once said, “an army marches on its stomach” and this remained true in World War II. 
Combat and living on the frontlines, required a huge volume of physical exertion which in turn 
necessitated large amounts of energy. The US Army during World War II had an international 
reputation of being well-fed in comparison to other belligerents. This reputation was in most 
cases well deserved. America generally fed its soldiers well throughout the war. That being said, 
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the combat soldier rarely had the same experience the rest of the Army had during their service 
in the US or behind the frontlines.  
The problem of feeding the combat soldier was the inability either to prepare meals on 
the frontlines or transport meals from kitchens in the rear to the soldiers on the frontlines. 
Combat conditions and the requirement for combat soldiers to almost continually man their 
positions on the frontline (usually just foxholes) severely restricted their access fresh, hot food 
and the huge morale boost it provided. Instead, combat soldiers had to make do with 
prepackaged rations, often eaten cold.
51
 These meals were monotonous, the quality was only fair 
and the quantity not enough. So while the GI used up large amount of energy in combat and 
trying to survive the elements, his rations did not adequately sustain him.
52
 For this very reason, 
the combat soldier was always on the lookout for ways to improve his food supply. This often 
meant requisitioning civilian food stuffs he came across during battle or trading with local 
civilians when the situation allowed. In just one example of this, Gene Garrison recalls a time 
when he and his buddies were so focused on the fresh cup of milk a farmer had just given them 
(it was the first fresh milk they had had since being in the US), that they failed to notice when the 
battalion commander showed up at their position.
53
 This simple cup of milk boosted the squad’s 
morale after a day of intense combat in poor weather conditions, but it was just a drop in a 
mostly empty bucket.  
                                                 
51
 The most common of these rations were designated K-rations and C-rations.  
52
 In November 1944, Sergeant Gantter recorded this sample breakfast menu while his unit was off the lines 
and had access to field kitchens. The meal included: “one-half ladle of hot cereal, one-third cup of coffee, one small 
teaspoon of sugar (you choose: either in your coffee or on your cereal), one tablespoon of milk (same choice), four 
dog biscuits (hardtack about the size of graham crackers, and one slice of bacon. I admit that this menu represents 
one of the bad days and often we at better. But sometimes we ate worse, and there were many days when even the 
dainties eaters wholeheartedly agreed with the wit who said, ‘In this goddamn army you don’t get enough to eat in a 
week to have one good bowel movement!’” Gantter, Roll Me Over, 12. 
53
 Garrison, Unless Victory Comes, 108-9.  
28 
 
 
The deficiency of satisfying or even adequate rations severely hampered morale in 
frontline units. Soldiers tired quickly of the monotony of the cold prepackaged rations.
54
 Captain 
MacDonald remembers it was a special event when one day on the Siegfried Line, his company 
received steak sandwiches that even cold “tasted like food for a king.”55 A hot meal always 
boosted morale and was often all that was need to lift the men’s spirits. Through dedication and 
hard work the cooks of the ETO were able to achieve the impressive feat of providing 
MacDonald, and all the other troops in the ETO, a turkey dinner on Thanksgiving Day in 1944.
56
 
He was lucky though because his was hot and most got to the frontlines cold. Had this occurred 
with any semblance of frequency or regularity the positive consequences for morale levels could 
have been dramatic. Establishing a theater-wide solution which ensured combat soldiers could 
receive hot meals with some regularity would have been one way for the Army to greatly 
improve morale in its combat units. As Pyle eloquently put it, “just one warm meal a day would 
have meant a great deal.”57Yet this was rarely the case in the ETO and damaged soldiers’ morale 
on a daily basis.  
The GI was relatively well clothed by 1944 for the summer campaign in France, but once 
the weather turned, “the infantryman’s clothing was woefully, even criminally inadequate.”58 
With the onset of a cold and rainy fall, the demand for warm winter clothing spiked. 
Unfortunately for the combat soldier, “in the Fall of 1944, there was a winter uniform supply 
crisis brought on by squabbling between the Army Quartermaster, War Production Board, and 
the officers in the ETO, notably [Generals] Eisenhower and Bradley… This led to production 
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and procurement delays throughout 1944 resulting in a severe shortage” of adequate winter 
clothing.
59
 The combat soldier suffered severely for this throughout the winter of 1944-45, which 
ended up being one of the coldest on record. So in addition to inadequate rations, combat soldiers 
had to deal with the additional stress of never being warm because they lacked proper clothing.  
This problem was especially acute during the Battle of the Bulge when a German 
offensive and breakthrough necessitated all focus be placed on stabilizing the strategic situation, 
leaving clothing resupply as a low priority.
60
 The Army again failed to support combat soldiers’ 
morale by issuing them adequate winter clothing and small unit leaders were powerless to 
influence strategic logistical decisions that produced this situation. The Army’s decisions 
lowered soldiers’ morale by forcing them to endure sub-freezing winter weather in this 
inadequate clothing. Instead soldiers like Sergeant Gantter wore whatever they could get their 
hands on. He recalls wearing “from the bottom up: overshoes (at last!), shoes, double sole 
woolen socks, woolen drawers and undershirt, wool shirt and trousers, sweater, scarf, field 
jacket, overcoat, gloves wool-knit cap, the towel snood I described to you, helmet liner and steel 
helmet.”61 Combat soldiers like Gantter spent as much time fighting the weather as he did the 
Germans and many non-battle casualties like hypothermia, frostbite and trench foot were 
sustained because of this. 
The environment that combat soldiers, especially infantrymen, were forced to live in, was 
particularly draining on their morale. If not actively engaged in combat, combat soldiers spent 
most of their time in foxholes (Figure 4). This included nights when the temperature dropped 
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below freezing and days when it had been raining for a week straight. “Under enemy fire, 
mobility may literally be reduced to zero, as when a soldier is pinned in his foxhole for hours or 
days” at a time. Many soldiers testified “that the severest fear producing situation they 
encountered in combat was just such immobilization under artillery or mortar fire.”62 This simple 
hole in the ground protected them from enemy fire, but was a miserable way to live. Gene 
Garrison had a traumatic experience sleeping in a foxhole one night. When he tried to get out of 
the hole the next morning, he realized he could not move. In his words: “The shelter half over the 
bottom of the hole was submerged in freezing cold water, which covered I had no feeling in my 
right arm, and none in my right leg. I felt numb all over. I struggled frantically to get up.”63 
Eventually Garrison regained feeling in his right side, but this was not an uncommon experience 
for GIs at all and its repetition day after day quickly eroded soldiers’ morale. 
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Figure 4: Foxholes  
 
 
 
 
 A GI was lucky if he was able to spend the night in a bombed out house and considered 
himself a king anytime he was fortunate enough to have four walls around him and a roof over 
his head. Spending weeks on end in foxholes took a terrible toll on soldiers’ bodies. They were 
often sick and trench foot became an epidemic problem during the fall and winter. According to 
Ambrose, “during the winter of 1944-45, some 45,000 men” were evacuated due to trench foot 
and many more suffered but remained on the line.
64
 Even when GIs were suffering from these 
ailments though, leaders often had no choice, but to keep these men in the line. They did not do 
this out of cruelty, but rather because they were always “so damned short of men.”65 Leaders 
needed everyman they could get their hands on to accomplish their missions or just to hold the 
line against German attacks (the success of which would only produce more casualties). On top 
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of that, sending the sick or those suffering from trench foot or frostbite back to an aid station 
only placed more strain on the few men that would be left thereby increasing their suffering and 
causing their morale levels to drop even further. It was an impossible situation for small unit 
leaders to say the least. No matter what they did, morale and the soldiers suffered physically, 
mentally and emotionally. The Army, for all of its power and authority, offered no solution to 
this problem of constant exposure to the elements so the GIs morale suffered and while they 
continued to rely on their foxholes throughout the ETO campaign.  
 Not surprisingly, hygiene standards also suffered in the primitive conditions of the 
frontlines. Soldiers commonly defecated (digestion problems were all too common due to the 
poor food quality) in their foxholes in order to avoid enemy small arms and artillery fire. In some 
exposed positions any movement out of one’s foxhole would draw an enemy barrage. It was safe 
to stay in one’s hole than to risk moving out of it to a latrine (if there was one). Soldiers were 
also expected to shave every day, but this regulation went out the window in combat. Soldiers 
rarely had the opportunity to shave while on the line due to shortages of water and their primitive 
living conditions. In a common example, after being on the line for a week, Captain MacDonald 
finally had the time and a place to shave. At this point he also “for the first time in four days” got 
the chance to wash his hands and face.
66
 Even worse though was that Capain. MacDonald once 
went two and a half months without bathing, except the occasional sponge bath from his 
helmet.
67
 Going this long without bathing was the norm rather than the exception for combat 
soldiers as Army sergeant turned cartoonist Bill Mauldin often referenced in his famous “Willie 
and Joe” cartoon series which followed two rough and dirty veteran combat infantry men 
through their experiences during the war. Combat certainly made the maintenance of living 
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standards difficult and in some cases understandably impossible, but the Army did not make 
adequate adjustments to its practices to ensure even a most basic standard of living in which 
combat soldiers could remain healthy. The conditions combat soldiers were forced to exist in 
exacerbated the significant stress of combat and when combined together, quickly lowered a 
soldier’s morale thereby making it much more difficult for him to remain motivated and continue 
to do his job. 
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Figure 5: “Willie and Joe” Cartoons on Frontline Hygiene  
  
 
 
Soldiers under the constant strain of combat, who had had their morale quickly eroded by 
a wide variety of factors often found it necessary to find some manner of stress relief. Many GIs, 
being young men and knowing they could be killed in combat any day, utilized cigarettes and 
alcohol for this purpose. Combat soldiers placed great value on having access to cigarettes and in 
this case the Army did an outstanding job of meeting the demand. The Army issued cigarettes 
liberally to soldiers, usually at the rate of a pack a day plus the cigarettes that came in the 
prepackaged rations and any that were handed out to them by the Red Cross, USO and Army rest 
Left: “No thanks, Willie. I’ll go look for some mud wot ain’t been used.” 
Right: “Drink it all boys---th’ guy wot put out the order about shavin’ain’t 
comin’ up here to inspect us.” 
Source: Bill Mauldin, Willie & Joe: The WWII Years, Edited by Todd DePastino (Seattle: 
Fantagraphics Books, 2008), 68 and 142.   
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centers.
68
 Soldiers who landed in France on D-Day were issued two cartons of cigarettes to 
ensure there would be no shortages in the beachhead during the initial stages of the landings 
when resupply opportunities were limited. “Observers who visited the beach later said the shore 
line was littered with cartons as far as the eye could see.”69 Many if not most combat soldiers 
made good use of all of these sources for cigarettes. Pyle related this anecdote in one of his 
dispatches: 
Murph [Charles J. Murphy] never smoked cigarettes until he landed in 
France on D-day, but after that he smoked one after another. He was about the 
tenth soldier who had told me that same thing. A guy in war has to have some 
outlets for his nerves, and I guess smoking is as good as anything.
70
 
 
As Pyle reasons, smoking was a reasonable stress reliever for combat soldiers and they certainly 
took advantage of it. A cigarette at just the right time could calm and steady a soldier and could 
do wonders for his morale. While rarely a problem, when soldiers could not get what they 
deemed were enough cigarettes, that was cause for serious griping and this situation had the 
reverse effect of harming soldier’s morale, for he did not appreciate being deprived of something 
he felt he deserved and was entitled to.
71
 On the whole though, the Army supported GIs’ morale 
through its liberal issuance of cigarettes.  
 Unlike many other armies of the time, the US Army did not provide an alcohol ration to 
its soldiers in combat.
72
 This, however, did not stop soldiers from acquiring alcohol by other 
means. There was plenty of alcohol to be found in the villages and cities of Europe and combat 
weary GIs became experts at procuring something to drink whenever they had the chance. While 
the consumption of alcohol by frontline soldiers was a grey area, their officers and NCOs often 
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looked the other way as long as a soldier’s performance did not suffer. Leaders understood the 
wonders a drink could do for a soldier’s morale when they were under the immense strain of 
daily combat. While by no means a healthy or medically approved stress management technique, 
smoking and drinking certainly worked in the short term and helped soldiers to keep going just a 
little bit longer. The temporary relaxation a soldier found with a drink was a boost to his morale 
and played a large role in the experience and morale maintenance of a combat soldier.  
Figure 6:“Willie and Joe” Cartoons on GIs and Alcohol 
 
 
Left: “Nein, nein—go ahead! I vould not think of interfering.” 
Right: “Them rats. Them dirty, cold-blooded, soreheaded, stinkin’ Huns. 
Them atrocity committin’ skunks!” 
Source: Bill Mauldin, Willie & Joe: The WWII Years, Edited by Todd DePastino (Seattle: 
Fantagraphics Books, 2008), 74 and 261.   
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 All of the subjects covered in this section are small details on their own, but when a GI 
had to deal with cold rations, inadequate clothing, exposure to the elements and sickness on top 
of the stress and fear induced by combat, one can see how together they quickly eroded morale. 
The GI was part of “the best-dressed, best-fed, best equipped army in the world,” but analysis of 
combat veterans’ experiences clearly demonstrates that this was still not enough to provide the 
basic necessities of life to many frontline soldiers.
73
 This lack of adequate support by the Army 
exposed soldiers to needless hardships, was responsible for additional casualties and constantly 
degraded soldiers’ morale while they were engaged in combat. 
Tactical Concerns 
Most combat in World War II occurred at the company level and below. 
Correspondingly, the world of the combat soldier was limited to this small scale. At this level, 
the daily focus of soldiers was on the immediate tactical situation. Rare was the combat soldier 
who had time to worry about the overall strategic situation. The combat soldier’s attention was 
focused on the events happening immediately around him as those were the ones that impacted 
his existence. These short-term, immediate concerns are referred to as the tactical situation. For 
the GI, the difference boiled down to, for example, why he cared about who his platoon leader 
was and not about who commanded his division. The division commander was simply too far 
removed from the individual soldier’s daily existence to have been relevant. The platoon leader 
on the other hand interacted with his soldiers daily and directly controlled all of their actions. 
Some of the major tactical concerns that were relevant to combat soldiers’ including quality of 
leadership, the nature and effect of casualties, the quality and effectiveness of soldiers’ combat 
training, and the outcome of combat engagements.  
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The importance of good leadership in combat cannot be overstated. The Army depended 
on small unit leaders to accomplish missions and they were expected to do so while looking out 
for the welfare of their soldiers. Often though, these two objectives were at extreme odds in 
combat and it was up to small unit leaders to strike the most appropriate balance possible. 
Morale came into play because if a leader could not strike a balance he was perceived as 
ineffective and soldiers lacked confidence in him. This led to low combat effectiveness and 
could have deadly consequences for a combat unit.  
 The Army maintained a complex program for the acquisition and training of officers 
throughout the war, but the effectiveness of the Army’s approach was questionable at best. 
Initially, the ground combat arms branches and particularly the Infantry, got the lowest quality 
officer recruits because those with special skills or more education were deemed critical and 
assigned to “technical” branches like the Air Corps. Thus, according to the Army, the Infantry 
did not require highly qualified officers, but nothing could have been further from the reality on 
the frontlines. Leading ground combat troops on the World War II battlefield was probably the 
most challenging job in the war, but the Army did not acknowledge this.  
On top of the low quality baseline, casualties among junior officers were extremely high 
in the ETO. “Casualties among second lieutenants were in some cases as high or higher than 
among riflemen in the line. It was not unusual to find a rifle company which after two or three 
months in combat had none of its original officers remaining in the unit.”74 Figure 7 shows the 
number of replacement officers sent to the ETO by month and what portion of those went to the 
infantry. In all but three months from June 1944 to April 1945, at least one-half of all 
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replacement officers went to the ETO which is another testament to the high casualty rates.
75
 Of 
those replacement officers, in all but two months, about 60% of them were assigned to the 
Infantry.
76
 These high casualty rates produced a situation where the Army had a chronic shortage 
of officer replacements. The In an effort to produce adequate numbers of replacements, training 
periods for new officers like Lieutenant George Wilson were shortened to as little as ninety 
days.
77
 When the situation became even more acute the Army briefly retrained already 
commissioned officers from the Anti-aircraft branch and transferred them to the infantry as 
platoon leaders.
78
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Figure 7: Overseas Shipments of AGF Officer Replacements
79
 
 
The combination of lower quality and undertrained replacement officers of which there 
was a severe shortage, meant there was significant absence of quality leadership sent to the 
frontlines and the GIs on the frontline were very well aware of this. This system did not inspire 
confidence in soldiers and lowered their morale. They were concerned that their leaders were 
incompetent and would not get them killed due to lack of training and inexperience. Lieutenant 
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George Wilson, of the 4
th
 Infantry Division, had to deal with these retread officers as an infantry 
company commander.
80
 He recalled one attack through some woods on the Siegfried Line in 
November of 1944 when a replacement officer failed to keep his platoon advancing when they 
suspected a German tank was moving to their front. The platoon panicked and began to retreat, 
threatening the entire battalion’s assault. The “tank” turned out to be a fallen tree trunk and the 
lieutenant was killed less than an hour later. It was his first day on the frontline.
81
 This is not to 
say that all officers assigned to combat units were inferior to their peers because as demonstrated 
by the great success of ground combat units in the ETO there were many incredibly talented and 
dedicated officers in combat units. Rather officers often did not score well in the Army’s 
assessment system and thus by the Army’s own metric of evaluation were of lower than desired 
quality.
82
 Following from this one sees that the Army did not place a proper emphasis on the 
high caliber of officer required to lead combat units that on the surface did not require as many 
measurable technical skills.  
Often an intense atmosphere of skepticism generally surrounded replacement officers 
until they proved their competence under fire. An encounter witnessed by Gene Garrison 
between a veteran sergeant and one of these replacement officers probably best expressed 
combat veterans’ initial reaction towards new officers. Garrison recalled his comrade saying the 
following about a new lieutenant, “‘Goddamned ninety-day wonder,’ the sergeant spat. ‘What 
does he know? He wasn’t here.’” 83 Divisiveness like this could have been deadly for both the 
GIs and the unit’s morale. A survey conducted by the Research Branch of soldiers in the ETO, 
however, found that infantry companies, more so than rear echelon soldiers, felt that their 
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officers were the kind to share the toughest experiences with them and that their officers took a 
personal interest in their well-being. Additionally, “the highest portion of favorable attitudes 
[towards officers] tended to be found among combat troops.”84 This can be attributed to the fact 
that the distinction between ranks became more blurred the closer to the fighting one got. This is 
the same conclusion that was drawn by the Research Branch during the war. In its report on the 
subject it noted that:  
The fact that combat soldiers had more favorable attitudes than other 
towards officers could be attributed in part to the opportunity to discharge their 
aggression directly against the enemy. But this would be much too simple a view 
of the matter. Among combat troops, whether air or ground, officers and enlisted 
men shared the common experiences of deprivation, danger and death. Social 
differentiations and special privileges were at a minimum.
85
 
 
These shared experiences and dangers quickly exposed officers who could not lead men in 
combat. This process also created a strong bond based on confidence and mutual respect between 
veteran combat officers and enlisted personnel. A unit with these attributes would have had 
resilient unit cohesion, high morale and formed an effective team in combat. The challenge was 
to build such a team in combat before too many members became casualties and the progression 
stalled. Unfortunately, the high casualty rates and poor officer training often led the process to 
fail and failure lowered unit morale and combat effectiveness.  
Essentially, the foundation of the officer corps in ground combat units was more 
questionable than it was in a branch like the Air Corps. This presented yet another needless 
obstacle for combat units to overcome in their pursuit of combat effectiveness. Small unit leaders 
could do little to rectify this situation either. They had to work with the leaders they had at their 
disposal, regardless of the quality, since they were in such short supply. The Army failed its 
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ground combat soldiers in this respect by not having the foresight to adequately prepare for or 
anticipate the critical importance of junior officers, especially to infantry operations. Well-
trained and highly-skilled junior officers, if provided in adequate numbers could have significant 
positive impacts on GIs’ morale levels and units combat effectiveness.  
Well trained and experienced NCOs were also critical to combat effectiveness and high 
unit morale because they were a key part of the leadership structure of small units. NCOs 
ensured that the plans developed by officers were properly and skillfully executed and that the 
men’s welfare was looked after. They also assumed roles normally filled by officers, like platoon 
leader, when there were no officers available to fill these vacancies. The NCOs of combat units, 
however, struggled with the same difficulties that faced the officer corps: a lack of qualified 
NCOs due to high casualty rates. It was also not easy to replace NCOs since one of their most 
important qualifications was combat experience. The Army tried to transfer NCOs into the 
infantry from overstaffed branches like Anti-Aircraft and the Army Air Corps, but as Gene 
Garrison observed, “there were some ill feelings towards these new men, because they brought 
previous rank with them yet had no experience in the infantry.”86  
The alternative left to company commanders was to promote soldiers from within the 
company, but this was not ideal either. Private Raymond Gantter of the 1
st
 Infantry Divison 
found himself the recipient of one of these quick promotions and thrust into an NCO position 
once his unit entered combat and the NCOs became casualties. As a result of the high casualty 
rates, men like Gantter became NCOs simply because they had survived combat for a few 
months or weeks and thus had the most combat experience; something that could not be said for 
the incoming replacements.
87
 Either situation left a unit desperate for experienced NCOs to help 
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form the backbone of the company. Without them, unit cohesion, combat effectiveness, the lives 
of the men and morale were all at sever risk. Again the Army failed to anticipate the 
requirements for strong NCOs and their replacement when casualties were suffered. Like the 
shortage of officers, this was severely detrimental not only to operational success, but to soldiers’ 
well-being.  
The situation on the battlefield at any given time and the success or failure of specific 
operations was probably one of the more obvious contributors to soldiers’ morale. It is safe to 
assume that victory in battle generally correlated with high morale and defeat with low morale, 
but on the modern battlefield the outcome is not always immediately clear so closer analysis of 
particular strategic situations is required. It is helpful to understand the situations sketched in The 
American Soldier: Combat and Its Aftermath as this work covers the most common scenarios 
that existed in the ETO.
88
 First, the classic rapid advance of the Army generally produced light 
casualties and many enemy prisoners. While this type of battle usually included close range 
fighting between small units, it “was favorable to high morale and a sense of group cohesion in 
carrying out a great achievement.” A second type of operation “was the assault on fortified 
positions….Such assaults always carried the threat of especially heavy casualties.” When this 
battle had to be executed quickly against “an alert and resolute defending force, the battle called 
primarily for a morale which would enable men to press on in an organized team even when 
casualties seemed terribly great.” Third and “probably most dreaded by experienced combat 
soldiers: the assault on defended beaches or across defended water barriers.” These operations 
sustained high casualties and required “cool and aggressive leadership.” Defensive operations 
were also conducted in the ETO and could “involve some of the most intensive combat… In 
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such situations there might be no hope of respite for indefinite periods.” Retreats and 
withdrawals could be psychologically stressful due to the yielding of ground that was hard won. 
“The confusion and disorganization of retreat following and enemy breakthrough was certainly 
among the most difficult situations a soldier could face.” Finally, the holding action during 
which soldiers merely had to man a stable section of frontline. Nevertheless, tedium, the 
harassing artillery and mortar fire, and the cumulative effects of poor living and sleeping 
conditions made this easiest of all combat conditions no real respite for the combat soldier.” 89  
While each of the above strategic situations impacted morale to an extent, all of them 
required GIs to be on the frontline under enemy fire. As long as GIs were on the frontline, their 
existence was rough and precarious. A GI could be killed just as easily in a holding action as he 
could in an assault on a fortified position. After spending some time on the line, most soldiers 
believed that it was just a matter of time before they became a casualty. If nothing else, extended 
periods of time spent on the frontline wore down GIs physically and mentally. Both this attitude 
towards becoming a casualty and the degrading effects of combat on soldiers were very 
detrimental to their morale. 
With ground combat units engaged in heavy fighting from 1944 to 1945 in the ETO, high 
casualty rates were unavoidable. With regards to an individual soldiers’ morale though, it was 
not the overall statistics that were important, but rather what happened on the small unit level. 
“…because men in combat were closely bound together by mutual dependence and affectional 
ties they were correspondingly shaken by the loss of comrades.”90 So not only were periods of 
heavy combat stressful by their nature, but their effects were in a sense doubled when soldiers 
experienced the loss of their comrades. It was traumatic enough to lose close friends through 
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gruesome wounds inflicted by the enemy, but witnessing death all around also increased a 
soldier’s sense of mortality. William Foley, of the 94th Infantry Division, experienced this feeling 
even before entering actual combat after seeing a dead GI who’s “one limb was black, shriveled, 
and footless.” The soldier behind Foley in line “gagged and then vomited against the wall” 
meanwhile the rest of the replacements behind him “tried to squeeze past him.” Foley described 
this incident as a “graphic introduction” and a “sudden glimpse at the reality of what [they] were 
getting into.” 91 This initial realization could be devastating to a soldier’s morale, sometimes 
even enough so that soldiers were unable to perform their duties. The only way to counteract 
these effects was being taken off the frontline, a topic which will be discussed later on.  
The bright spot for morale with regards to casualties were the actions of the combat 
medics and the subsequent chain of medical care. Combat medics were revered for their heroism 
and commitment to saving the lives of their comrades, often at great personal risk. During 
training stateside, the term for these unarmed soldiers was medic or aid man, but as medic Buddy 
Gianelloni recalled, in combat he and other medics quickly became referred to affectionately as 
“Doc.” At the time Gianelloni, like so many of his fellow medics, was only nineteen years old.92  
Historian Stephen Ambrose recalled “On countless occasions, when I’ve asked a veteran during 
an interview if he remembered any medics, the old man would say something like. “Bravest man 
I ever saw. Let me tell you about him…”93 The security gained from knowing that when a soldier 
was wounded, a medic would be there to treat him almost instantly was of supreme value in 
motivating soldiers to continually expose themselves to danger in order to complete missions. 
The medics assigned to combat units and the medical support structure behind the lines did an 
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outstanding job as proved by the fact that “over 85 percent of the soldiers who underwent 
emergency operations in a mobile field hospital or evacuation hospital survived.”94 To the 
frontline soldier this statistic translated into the sentiment “as one lieutenant put it, “We were 
convinced the Army had a regulation against dying in an aid station.”95 This intangible, but very 
real sense of security certainly had a subtle, positive effect on soldiers’ morale. The success of 
the Medical Department and combat medics in supporting soldiers’ morale was one of the 
Army’s great achievements during the war.  
The quality of training soldiers received prior to entering combat also affected their 
morale, especially when they faced their first test of combat. Much has already been written on 
the quality of training, including an entire volume of the Army’s official World War II history 
dedicated to the subject.
96
 Training quality affected soldier morale in two ways. First, it 
influenced the confidence level of soldiers entering combat for the first time. Many veterans 
detail in their memoirs how they worried how well prepared they were to handle the demands of 
combat. Their inexperience led them to question whether or not they would know what to do 
once at the front and under fire.
97
 These feelings were corroborated by surveys (shown in Figure 
8, “Self-Confidence in Infantry Companies”) conducted by the Research Branch that indicated 
less than one-third of soldiers felt they had received enough training and were ready for combat 
just prior to the D-Day landings on June 6, 1944 .
98
 Quality of training was a particular problem 
for replacements because they “had probably had briefer training than men who had trained with 
their combat division.” Post-combat evaluations conducted by the Research Branch in August 
1944 support this since replacements who survived to become veterans self-reported higher 
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incidents of potentially deadly mistakes they made in combat which points to their lower quality 
of training as the problem.
 99
 Finally, the Research Branch acknowledged that there was a 
possible correlation between lack of training and low morale in that it stated “that fear reactions 
in combat may be due, in part, to an attitudinal factor—the feeling that one has not had sufficient 
training for one’s combat job.”100 Clearly soldiers who lacked “adequate preparation,” suffered 
from lower morale from the start because it increased their chances of becoming a casualty.
101
 
Unfortunately, there was nothing small unit leaders could do to rectify this problem except give 
crash courses in battlefield survival and on the job training whenever possible in an effort to help 
replacements survive. The task of adequate training fell to the Army and forced to decide 
between a shortage of bodies in combat outfits and sending undertrained soldiers into combat, it 
chose the latter, but men died and morale suffered because of it. 
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Figure 8: Self-Confidence in Infantry Companies
 102
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The second effect of training quality was the concern of combat veterans that the 
replacements they received were inadequately trained for the tasks demanded of them by combat. 
These concerns were well documented by combat veterans in reports submitted to higher 
headquarters. In general, they criticize the lack of realistic battle and directly applicable training 
given to replacements. Veterans of all ranks observed that replacements should be exposed to 
more live fire drills to get them accustomed to the combat experience as early as possible. They 
also recommend more practical weapons training with both personal and crew served weapons. It 
was noted that replacements often did not have the necessary skills to properly employ machine 
guns and bazookas, nor were they skilled in using their personal rifles in circumstances other 
than the rifle range. These failures of training presented serious problems when replacements 
were thrown into a unit just before or as it was engaged in an action. With no way to test the 
replacements, the veterans of a unit had to trust that the replacements were capable of doing their 
jobs and watching their backs. Unfortunately, with the deteriorated quality of training, this was 
not often the case. The lack of confidence promoted by this situation hampered the morale of the 
veterans because they could not trust the replacements the Army was sending them with their 
lives. Essentially, they could not trust the Army to provide them with the qualified personnel 
necessary not only to win battles, but to ensure their own personal survival through the mutual 
protect one expects in a combat unit. 
103
  
“It was not the job of the front-line machine gunner or tanker to train replacements. The 
Army was supposed to do that and it failed.”104 This failure caused combat soldiers’ morale to 
suffer and as a consequence so did their performance. Even in 1944 and 1945, after the Army 
had seen the results of its training program firsthand on battlefields around the world, 
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replacement soldiers arriving in the ETO still required additional training if they were to have a 
chance at survival. Some divisions established official training centers for the replacements they 
received, but often this task fell to small unit leaders to try and train their replacements during 
brief lulls in combat and short rest periods.
105
 Frequently, the best that could be done was a few 
words of advice from a squad leader the first night a replacement arrived on the line and then 
hope he survived the until the next morning when a little bit more knowledge could be imparted. 
Repeating this process and a lot of luck would in theory lead to a replacements survival and thus 
entrance into the ranks of the combat veteran. 
No Escape from the Frontlines 
Possibly the most significant demoralizing aspect of the combat soldier’s experience was 
the realization that occurred after just a short time in the line: that there was no way to escape the 
horrors of the frontline. Throughout the war the ground combat soldier was subject to an Army 
system that essentially condemned them to three possible fates: to be killed, to be wounded, or to 
become a combat exhaustion casualty. The only escape from these outcomes was the end of the 
war. There was also little opportunity for any real rest once a soldier entered combat. Once a 
division was committed to combat that division essentially remained on the line until the end of 
the war. This subjected combat soldiers to day after day of exposure to the brutal conditions of 
combat. Fussell, describes what this constant combat will do to a soldier:  
Inevitably, all will break down if in combat long enough. “Long enough” is now 
defined by physicians and psychiatrists as between 200 and 240 days. As medical 
observers have reported, “there is no such thing as ‘getting used to combat’…Each 
moment of combat imposes a strain so great that men will break down in direct relation to 
the intensity and duration of their experience.”106 
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While veteran combat soldiers understood that there was only so much stress and demoralization 
a man could take, the Army learned this officially in a study conducted by the Research Branch, 
published in April 1945. Table 4 shows how every soldier peaked in their effectiveness after a 
certain amount of time in combat and after that peak began a steady decline towards combat 
exhaustion. 
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Figure 9: Quality of GIs by Time in Combat
107
 
 
The Army also maintained a policy through which few soldiers were ever rotated home 
for a furlough even though many spent years overseas.
108
 This prevented combat soldiers from 
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being able to look forward to a certain, measurable point at which they would officially have 
fulfilled their service obligation and had earned a break. This made soldiers quite bitter because 
the Air Corps, considered a much less dangerous and more pleasant branch by ground combat 
soldiers, in fact had a rotation policy in place where after a certain number of missions airmen 
were rotated back to the US. Captain MacDonald’s unit, had one experience with a rotation 
policy for the infantry in which four men were selected for a ninety-day furlough to the US. 
“Most men who took the time to figure, however, found that unless drastic changes in the system 
took place, it would be 1999 before they would see the States again—barring serious wounds, 
the only salvation.”109 That calculation alone was enough to degrade any soldier’s morale.  
The lack of an effective rotation policy added to the soldiers’ need for periods of rest off 
the frontline. While these did occur, they were too irregular and too infrequent to counteract the 
long periods of combat soldiers were often subjected to. Then if a soldier’s unit was pulled out of 
the line, it was often given additional tasks that prevented the men from getting the rest the 
desperately needed. This placed a severe strain on the soldiers’ morale. The lack of a rotation 
policy and inadequate rest meant that once a soldier was assigned to a frontline unit, he would 
almost inevitably become a casualty of one sort or another. The odds were heavily stacked 
against the combat soldier. 
The replacement system was deeply flawed and caused many problems for combat 
soldiers. One of these was that it also returned wounded soldiers to their frontline units after they 
had recovered and “nearly three soldiers in four were returned to duty” by the medical system 
after being wounded.
110
 After this recovery period, the soldier would either be sent back to his 
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unit or to a new combat unit through the replacement system depending on how long his 
recovery had taken. Because of this many GIs were wounded multiple times. The problem is that 
these same soldiers who had already been worn down by combat had to keep going back until 
they were wounded too badly to fight, they were killed or the war ended. Gene Garrison had 
several of his friends return to his unit and pick up fighting where they had left off.
111
All the 
while, other soldiers enjoyed safe jobs behind the lines. This fostered even more resentment for 
rear-area personnel amongst combat troops who felt slighted yet again. The GI was generally 
willing to do his fair share and did not slink away from combat duty, but also resented the 
unfairness enforced by this replacement/return-to-duty system.  
The realization for a combat soldier that he was only going to escape the frontlines 
through the end of the war or becoming a serious casualty seriously affected ones mental well-
being and morale level. It is difficult to keep going, caring about one’s assigned job, while 
waiting to be wounded or killed and meanwhile watching it happen all around you. This is on top 
of all of the other stressors, hardships and difficulties one was subjected to on the frontlines. 
One’s morale can only last so long under such conditions before a soldier becomes completely 
drained. The system emplaced by the Army during World War II, however, forced the soldier 
into exactly this deadly situation and left them there. Not enough regard was given to adequate 
rest periods, the opportunity for rotation back to the US or a safer job, or to the plight of 
replacements being funneled into the frontlines on a daily basis. The Army structure that was 
supposed to be behind the soldiers on the frontline actually set these GIs up for failure and even 
after the Army had the evidence that this was the case, it continued with the same system despite 
the pleas from those at the front who knew that the system had to change and doing so could 
prevent much pain, suffering and hardship in the ranks of the combat soldier.  
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What we have seen so far is that morale is an extremely complex issue comprised of 
many different attributes including pride, confidence, courage, aggression, dependable 
performance, selfless-sacrifice and co-operation.  We have also seen that while there were some 
bright spots for combat soldiers including unit pride, occasional credit for actions, camaraderie, 
medical care, and battlefield success, there were many more factors that collectively eroded 
soldiers’ morale from every possible angle, quickly wearing them down. Recall how the 
replacement system, high casualty rates, the lack of a rotation policy, sub-standard training, a 
lack of proper clothing, inadequate rations, poor hygiene and exposure to the elements served to 
erode soldiers’ morale. Too often, combat soldiers who were on the frontlines for far too long 
without a break had their morale completely destroyed by their experiences. The result was a 
new category of wound: the combat exhaustion casualty. 
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CONCLUSION: THE FAILURE OF MORALE 
 
Where the Army failed during World War II was in the prevention of these combat 
exhaustion casualties occurring in the first place. This paper has detailed the many on the 
difficulties combat soldiers faced when it came to maintaining high morale. While the Army may 
have realized the importance of maintaining morale, little was done to prevent combat 
exhaustion from occurring. In several cases, the strategies adhered to by the Army, particularly 
the replacement system, worked against high morale and undermined the combat soldier instead 
of supporting him. In doing this, the Army reduced its soldiers’ morale level and its own combat 
effectiveness, thereby possibly prolonging the war. It also unnecessarily increased the burden 
placed on the relatively small number of soldiers actually engaged in combat in the ETO.  
The condition of combat exhaustion was not entirely new in World War II. It was known 
as “shell shock” in WWI and certainly soldiers have always suffered mentally after engaging in 
combat. In World War II though, progress was made in identifying and treating the condition. 
The first step in treating the wound though was identifying it which the Medical Department 
does here: 
The army’s chief neuropsychiatrist graphically described the distinctive 
symptoms of a combat exhaustion casualty: “Typically he appeared as a dejected, 
dirty, weary man. His facial expression was one of depression sometimes of 
tearfulness. Frequently his hands were trembling or jerky. Occasionally he would 
display varying degrees of confusion, perhaps to the extent of being mute or 
staring into space. Very occasionally he might present classically hysterical 
symptoms.
112
 
 
The triggers for this condition were generally of two types. The first was the initial entry into 
combat and the shock to one’s system this entailed. The second was prolonged exposure to 
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frontline combat. This would be the case of the combat veteran breaking after 200-240 days. The 
condition presented in a wide variety of ways and its symptoms were often influenced by a 
specific, particularly traumatic experience of the soldier.
113
 Early in the war, the Army was 
uncertain about how to handle the condition, but by the invasion of France in 1944, treatment 
was part of the planning phase.  
In Normandy, there was an entire field hospital dedicated only to treating these casualties 
since they required special psychological treatment the rest of the system was not equipped to 
handle. This field hospital had more psychiatric assets and provided soldiers with the things they 
needed most, a warm bed, food, a chance to get cleaned up and most importantly, rest. Other 
techniques, however, were being experimented with throughout the ETO. For example, the 4
th
 
Division established its own rest center for exhaustion cases. They had found that keeping cases 
as close to their units as possible helped a great deal, as long as they were safe from any danger, 
which they were. Additionally, this solution ensured that recovered cases did not have to 
navigate the hellish replacement system and could return directly to their units. This was critical 
because the sense of familiarity and security were important to preventing combat exhaustion 
and these veterans had already established a place for themselves in their units. By the end of the 
war, the Medical Department and combat units in general had a better understanding of how to 
treat these combat exhaustion cases demonstrated by the fact that most cases were returned to 
duty of some kind after treatment. 
True combat exhaustion was not something frowned upon on the frontlines by other 
combat veterans. While leaders had the say over who was evacuated as an exhaustion casualty 
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and who was not, this did not stop the other men of the unit from passing judgment. In general, if 
the man who “broke” was a combat veteran and had a good record with the unit it was accepted 
that he had just reached his limit and that was all that could have been asked from him.
114
 The 
common consensus was that everyman had his limit, some could take more than others and a 
soldier was expected to take as much as he could, for to fake exhaustion in order to be evacuated 
was shameful and hurt every other man who would remain behind.
115
 Often men would return 
after they had had a brief rest, some good food and a hot shower, which is just the type of 
treatment Maj. Richard Winters of the 101
st
 Airborne Division advocated for.
116
 This was seen as 
the mark of a good soldier who was loyal to his unit since he returned to them as soon as he was 
able to and continued to do his duty. He did not take the opportunity to avoid returning to combat 
despite its misery. There were those, however, who tried to fake the condition in order to escape 
the frontlines. These men were seen as cowards and lost their comrades respect and trust.
117
 
Good leaders could usually see through this charade and would simply refuse to evacuate the 
healthy soldier, like Lieutenant Wilson did in the Hurtgen Forest.
 118
 A general measuring tool 
used was the level of physical incapacitation suffered by the casualty. According to observations 
made by the Research Branch while interviewing combat veterans, the general consensus on how 
to view these casualties was that “a soldier whose symptoms persisted long after the objective 
danged subsided was generally regarded by his fellows as a sick man…The key factor which was 
stressed by the interviewees was effort to overcome the withdrawal tendencies engendered by 
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intense fear [original emphasis].”119 Eventually, the soldier faking exhaustion would have to give 
up the act.   
 While the Army structure as a larger organization failed to support the morale of the 
combat soldier in many ways, the same cannot be said for his small unit leaders and comrades. 
The tightknit group that formed at the front blurred the officer-enlisted distinction and supported 
itself as much as possible. Officers protected their men from the interference of higher echelon 
units since they had enough on their hands to begin with and looked the other way when the men 
indulged with a bottle of cognac on a sub-zero night. While this camaraderie was essential to 
battlefield success and maintenance of unit morale, it was not always enough to preserve the 
individual morale of soldiers, resulting in high rates of combat exhaustion. Furthermore, only so 
much could be accomplished at the small unit level. A company commander, as much as he 
might try, could not change the replacement system used by the Army. His company, he and the 
replacements it received were forced to work within the system. Likewise a squad leader could 
not send a soldier to a rest center just because he had been in the line for over 200 days and the 
squad leader could tell he was nearing his breaking point. In such a situation the squad leader 
restricted because there was always another mission to conduct with his likely understrength 
squad and voluntarily sending another man away would have increased the workload on those 
that remained on the line.
120
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 Over the course of World War II and especially from 1944 to 1945 the Army experienced 
many hard lessons on the practical importance of morale and the devastating consequences of its 
failure. The great success story is how frontline troops coped with and adapted to the hazards to 
high morale on the battlefield in order to persevere and accomplish their missions. To the 
frontline soldier though it must have seemed like the Army was often conspiring against its own 
troops success. One must also acknowledge, however, the multiplicity of competing interests and 
priorities during wartime that often prevented the Army from focusing solely on soldiers’ morale 
level. Simultaneously though, it is a tragedy that so many men suffered through an experience 
that could have been significantly improved through better forethought and planning and though 
being more aware and adaptable to feedback from the battlefield. Some small changes, like 
regular hot meals and rest periods, could have significantly improved soldiers’ morale level, 
combat effectiveness and overall wartime experience.  
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GLOSSARY 
 
AGF - Army Ground Forces 
ASF - Army Service Forces 
CIB - Combat Infantryman’s Badge; World War II “demonstrated the importance of highly 
proficient, tough, hard and aggressive infantry, which can be obtained only by developing a high 
degree of individual all-around proficiency on the part of every infantryman. As a means of 
attaining the high standards desired and to foster esprit de corps in infantry units; the Expert 
Infantryman and the Combat Infantryman badges are established for infantry personnel.”121 The 
CIB could only be awarded after combat service.  
Combat Exhaustion - technically termed just “Exhaustion” by the Medical Dept. in order to 
avoid worrying patients; this was the emotional or physical breakdown that soldiers suffered 
after having been exposed to a particularly traumatic or prolonged combat experience. It was 
eventually recognized and treated by the Medical Department, which found that most patients 
recovered after being given a few days of rest, hot food and a chance to clean up.
122
 
Company grade officers - Platoon leaders (lieutenants) and company commanders (captains) 
Dogfoot - One of many nicknames for the infantry soldier. Others include: dogface and grunts. 
EIB - Expert Infantryman’s Badge; awarded for proficiency as an Infantryman; See also CIB.  
ETO - European Theater of Operations; refers to France, Belgium, Holland, Luxemburg, 
Germany, Austria and Czechoslovakia and the operations that took place in these areas. Italy, 
although part of Europe, was included in the Mediterranean Theater of Operations.  
GI - a slang term for the average American soldier during World War II, standing for 
Government Issue or General Issue, with reference to the contrast that existed between the 
former civilians with individuality who became just one of millions of men in the Army during 
the mobilization. 
Mess - food, chow 
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Mortar - a small artillery piece organic to and controlled at the company level that could fire 
small shells at a high trajectory up to 1,800 yards 
NCO - Noncommissioned Officer (corporals and sergeants) 
Platoon leader (PL) - A lieutenant who was responsible for the training, discipline, control, and 
tactical employment of his platoon.
123
 
Platoon sergeant (PSG) - a senior sergeant who assisted the platoon leader and served as second 
in command of a platoon; generally responsible for supplies and looking after the welfare of the 
soldiers 
Squad leader (SL) - generally a sergeant or staff sergeant and was “responsible for their 
employment, training, and sustenance”124 
Trenchfoot - Trenchfoot occurs after prolonged exposure of the feet to wet and cold conditions. 
GIs were susceptible because they had inadequate foot ware and lived outside in the elements 
with no way to get warm or dry. When a soldier got trench foot, first the man “lost his toenails. 
Then his feet turned white, then purple, finally black. A serious case of trenchfoot made walking 
impossible. Many men lost their toes, some had to have their feet amputated.”125 
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     Source: Doubler, Closing With The Enemy, 236-7.  
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